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PROTECTION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AND PRESERVATION OF BASIC AMERICAN RIGHTS
Comments on the Report of
the Commission on Government Security
Samuel H. Libermant
On June 21, 1957 the Commission on Government Security, estab-
lished by joint resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives,"
filed its report2 with the President and the Congress.
Legislation to implement the recommendations contained in the
report was introduced both in the House of Representatives and the
Senate sometime after the report was filed, but because other impor-
tant controversial matters were then pending and because adjourn-
ment was imminent, no action was taken thereon during the first
session of the 85th Congress.
However, since legislation based upon the report will probably be
introduced at the second session of the 85th Congress, which began in
January of 1958, some comment on the conclusions reached by the
Commission may prove to be of interest to the Bar at this time.
DECLARATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POLICY
Since the Commission was established "for the purpose of carrying-
out the policy set forth" in the joint resolution, a consideration of the
declared congressional purpose is essential if one is to evaluate the
work of the Commission.
t Member of the Missouri Bar.
1. See 69 Stat. 595 (1955), 50 U.S.C. § 781 (Supp. IV, 1957).
2. Report of the Commission on Government Security (1957) (hereafter cited
Report).
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The declaration of policy in public law 304 is set forth in section 1
of the joint resolution and reads as follows:
Section 1. It is vital to the welfare and safety of the United
States that there be adequate protection of the national security,
including the safeguarding of all national defense secrets and
public and private defense installations, against loss or com-
promise arising from espionage, sabotage, disloyalty, subversive
activities, or unauthorized disclosures.
It is, therefore, the policy of the Congress that there shall exist
a sound Government program-
(a) establishing procedures for security investigation, evalua-
tion, and, where necessary, adjudication of Government em-
ployees, and also appropriate security requirements with respect
to persons privately employed or occupied on work requiring
access to national defense secrets or work affording significant
opportunity for injury to the national security;
(b) for vigorous enforcement of effective and realistic security
laws and regulations; and
(c) for a careful, consistent, and efficient administration of this
policy in a manner which will protect the national security and
preserve basic American rights.3
COMPOSITION OF COMMISSION
The Commission was composed of twelve members, four of whom
were appointed by the President, four by the President of the Senate
and four by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Under the
terms of the joint resolution, two of the appointments to be made by
the President were to be from the executive branch of the government
and two from private life; two of the appointments to be made by the
President of the Senate were to be from the Senate and two from
private life; two of the appointments to be made by the Speaker were
to come from the House of Representatives and txvo from private life.
Not more than two of the four appointees designated by the President,
President of the Senate, and Speaker of the House, respectively, were
to be from the same political party.
President Eisenhower appointed from the executive branch Carter
Burgess, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Defense, and Louis
S. Rothshild, Under Secretary of Commerce, and from private life
Dr. Franklin D. Murphy, Chancellor, University of Kansas, and James
P. McGranery, former United States District Judge and former At-
torney General of the United States. Upon the resignation of Mr.
Burgess as Assistant Secretary of Defense the President appointed
in his stead F. Moran McConihe, Commissioner, Public Building Ser-
vice, General Services Administration.
Vice-President Nixon, as President of the Senate, appointed from
3. See note I supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1958/iss1/7
GOVERNMENT SECURITY
the Senate Norris Cotton of New Hampshire and John Stennis of
Mississippi, and from private life Dr. Susan B. Riley, Professor of
English, George Peabody College for Teachers, and Lloyd Wright,
former President of the American Bar Association.
Speaker Rayburn appointed from the House of Representatives
William M. McCulloch of Ohio and Francis E. Walter of Pennsylvania,
and from private life James L. Noel, Jr., attorney at law, and Edwin
L. Mechem, Governor of New Mexico.
The Commission selected Mr. Wright as Chairman and Senator
Stennis as Vice-Chairman.
DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION
The Commission was directed to study and investigate the entire
government security program. This included the various statutes,
presidential orders, administrative regulations and directives under
which the government seeks to protect the national security, together
with the actual manner in which such statutes, orders, regulations
and directives had been and were being administered and imple-
mented. The view in mind was determining whether existing require-
ments, practices, and procedures were in accordance with the policy
set forth in the joint resolution and recommending such changes as
the Commission might determine were necessary or desirable. The
Commission was also directed to submit reports and recommendations
on the adequacy or deficiency of existing programs and their adminis-
tration, from the standpoint of internal consistency of the overall
security program and effective protection and maintenance of the
national security.
SCOPE OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS
Some idea of the nature and extent of the studies and investigations
made by the Commission may be gleaned from the fact that in its re-
port the Commission has made recommendations in the following
areas: (1) Federal Civilian Employees' Loyalty Program, 4 (2) Mili-
tary Personnel Program, 5 (3) Document Classification Program,6 (4)
Atomic Energy ProgramJ (5) Industrial Security Program,8 (6) Port
Security Program,, (7) International Organizations Programs,"O (8)
Passport Security Program," (9) Civil Air Transport Security Pro-
4. Report at 3-107.
5. Id. at 111-48.
6. Id. at 151-74.
7. Id. at 187-232.
8. Id. at 235-319.
9. Id. at 323-65.
10. Id. at 369-442.
11. Id. at 445-95.
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gram, 2 (10) Immigration and Nationality Program, 3 and (11) Crim-
inal Statutes. 4
In addition the report contains special studies relating to the pro-
posed Central Security Office,' 5 the attorney general's list,0 confron-
tation,1 subpoena power,"8 and the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.19
To minimize or eliminate so far as possible any misunderstanding
of the recommendations contained in its report and to put such rec-
ommendations in concrete form, the Commission drafted and included
in its report proposed legislation and executive orders which it felt
were necessary to carry out its recommendations. 20
It would obviously be impossible to discuss all the facets of the
many problems covered by the Report in an article of this nature.
Therefore, the comments which follow will be limited principally to a
consideration of (a) recommendations designed to extend greater
protection to individuals involved in loyalty or security proceedings,
(b) recommendations designed to avoid the dangers of overclassifica-
tion of defense information and materials, (c) recommendations de-
signed to promote a greater degree of uniformity, consistency, and
efficiency in the administration of the various programs, (d) recom-
mendations designed to promote vigorous enforcement of effective and
realistic security laws, and (e) constitutional issues arising out of the
operation of loyalty and security programs.
Recommendations Designed to Extend
Greater Protection to Individuals
As heretofore pointed out, Congress in the joint resolution estab-
lishing the Commission called for a sound program that could be care-
fully, consistently, and efficiently administered in a manner which
would not only protect the national security but "preserve basic
American rights."
The lawyer, whether he be judge, teacher, or practitioner, is par-
ticularly aware of the conflicts that arise between competing interests
of the individual on the one hand and society on the other. Perhaps
the most challenging aspect of a lawyer's work is resolving such con-
flicts. With respect to the operation of loyalty-security programs, the
12. Id. at 499-516.
13. Id. at 519-612.
14. Id. at 615-30.
15. Id. at 633-43.
16. Id. at 645-55.
17. Id. at 657-71.
18. Id. at 673-74.
19. Id. at 675-81.
20. Id. at 691-756.
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interests both of society and of the individual are of the highest order.
In the case of society it is the interest of the nation in self-preserva-
tion; in the case of the individual it is adequate protection against an
arbitrary adverse determination resulting in grave damage to reputa-
tion and serious economic consequences.
Because lawyers possess special training and competence for resolv-
ing conflicts of this nature, the legal profession could render a valuable
public service if, after a study of the report of the Commission, its
views were made known to the Congress and the public. The Com-
mission's recommendations, if adopted, would substantially improve
the position of the individual in the respects hereinafter enumerated.
(1) Change of Standard and Criteria in Civilian Employee and
Military Personnel Programs
The present standard for employment and retention in employment
of civilian employees2 1 and for appointment, enlistment and retention
in the armed forces-2 requires that employment, appointment, enlist-
ment or retention be "clearly consistent with the interests of national
security."
This standard has been severely criticized as (1) placing an undue
burden to establish fitness upon the individual and (2) conferring too
wide a range of discretion upon the responsible authority.
A substantial number of the criteria 23 established for applying the
standard relate to conduct or personality defects affecting suitability,
such as behavior, activities or associations tending to show the indi-
vidual is not reliable or trustworthy, falsification of material facts,
criminal conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction,
sexual perversion, and physical and mental illness.
The consequences resulting from the denial of employment, or denial
of admission to the armed forces, or discharge from either civilian
employment or military service for security reasons are infinitely
more grave than when the grounds stem from lack of suitability.
The studies of the Commission disclosed that the overwhelming
majority of "security-risk" discharges of civilian employees under
Executive Order 10450 were based upon the lack of suitability under
civil service requirements and were in fact effectuated through the use
of civil service procedures. It is, of course, true that the lack of suita-
bility may, and in certain situations does, operate to make the indi-
vidual a security risk. But when the cause for dismissal is essentially
lack of appropriate suitability, no useful purpose is served by adding
the security risk label.
21. See Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
22. Department of Defense Directive as reissued June 19, 1956.
23. Section 8(a) 1-8, Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
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The Commission was of the view that where, as in the case of
civilian employees or members of the armed forces, absence of suita-
bility constitutes grounds for disqualification, the standard and cri-
teria should relate solely to suitability. Accordingly, the only security-
risk standard it recommends in respect to civilian and military per-
sonnel is that, on all the available information, a reasonable doubt
exists about the loyalty of the individual. The criteria it recommends,
then, for ascertaining whether or not the standard is met, relate solely
to loyalty.
(2) Application of Loyalty Standard and Criteria
When applying the standard and criteria to specific cases, the Com-
mission points out that an adverse determination must be based upon
information that is reliable and trustvorthy, "for obviously a doubt
not based upon such information would be arbitrary or fanciful as
distinguished from reasonable. ' '24
The Commission's report emphasizes that in the screening, hearing,
and adjudicative processes, "greatest care must be taken to avoid mis-
interpretation of affiliation. The affiliation should be viewed in the
light of the member's knowledge of the purposes of the organization,
or the extent to which such organizational purpose has been publicized
at the time the individual joined the organization or retained member-
ship therein. The character and history of an organization must be
closely examined with the realization that loyal persons may have
been persuaded to join for innocent reasons." 25
Normal associations with members of one's family, even though
they are close, continuing, and sympathetic, are not sufficient to create
a reasonable doubt about loyalty unless they indicate a sympathetic
association with an organization which Congress or a duly authorized
agency or officer of the United States has found seeks to alter the
form of government of the United States by force, violence, or other
unconstitutional means, or seeks to accomplish a related objective as
set forth in the proposed criteria.
While past membership in the Communist Party or past associa-
tions with communists are factors to be considered, they should not
be applied mechanically or automatically. Efforts should be made to
determine the degree to which the person concerned has broken with
past contacts.
24. Report at 49.
25. Ibid.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1958/iss1/7
GOVERNMENT SECURITY
(3) Mandatory Oral Interview by Screening Officer Prior to
Issuance of Letter of Charges
Before a letter of charges based upon loyalty grounds may be issued
the Commission's recommendations specify that the screening officer
must grant the individual an oral interview and afford him an oppor-
tunity to refute or explain any derogatory information. If, after such
an interview further investigation is required, the screening officer
should request the appropriate investigative agency to make it. Then,
after completion of the oral interview and any further investigation,
if the screening officer concludes that there is substantial reliable in-
formation indicating the existence of reasonable doubt, a letter of
charges may issue.
Under existing practices, some departments and agencies do call in
the employee and give him an opportunity to explain, but the require-
ment is not mandatory. The Commission found that in a substantial
number of cases an oral interview would have obviated the necessity
of filing charges and conducting a hearing.
(4) Suspension, Termination, or Transfer of Suspected Employees
Public Law 733, authorizing suspension and termination when
necessary for the interests of national security, has been construed
by the attorney general as making suspension mandatory.
Suspension should not occur if instead the employee may be trans-
ferred; when suspension is necessary to protect the national security
it should be with pay, pending an adverse decision after hearing.
The Commission was of the view that transfer, in lieu of suspension,
would not endanger the national security if the transfer could be
made to a position where the employee could not do anything harmful
to the national security. The Commission further felt that if suspen-
sion was necessary because of the non-availability of such other posi-
tion, an undue hardship would result if the employee lost his means
of livelihood before he had the benefit of further investigation or
hearing.
Under the recommendations of the Commission when the character
of the derogatory information relating to loyalty, and the weight at-
tached thereto by the officer having authority to suspend, are such as
to require immediate removal of the employee from the position he
then occupies pending either further investigation or hearing, such
removal should be accomplished in the first instance by a transfer to
another position where there is no opportunity to affect adversely the
national security.
If suspension is necessary because no position for which the em-
ployee is qualified is available, initial suspension shall be with pay.
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The employee shall continue to draw pay until after he has had a
hearing and after the head of the agency has made an adverse de-
termination. The ultimate decision to suspend must be made by an
officer of the department or agency not inferior in rank to an assistant
secretary, or the equivalent thereof.
Although other recommendations permit an employee to appeal an
order of final suspension to the Loyalty Review Board, he is not en-
titled to pay during the pendency of this appeal. If the employee is
ultimately cleared he is entitled to full pay less any amounts he shall
have earned during the period of suspension without pay. Priority
is to be given to processing suspension cases that require further in-
vestigation, and to hearing those cases in which a letter of charges"
has been filed.
(5) Letter of Charges to be Specific and Comprehensive
The letter of charges must be sufficiently detailed and specific, in-
cluding names, dates and places, to permit the individual involved
to make a reasonable answer, and the hearings must be confined to
matters contained in the letter of charges.
Although the recommendation states that the "letter of charges
should be as specific and detailed as the interests of national security
permit,"26 it is the opinion of the writer that the only type of infor-
mation which may be excluded from the letter of charges under the
qualifying words "as the interests of national security permit" is in-
formation which would tend to reveal the identity of a confidential
informant. This view is predicated upon provisions in other recom-
mendations27 stating that the substance of derogatory loyalty informa-
tion supplied by the regularly established confidential informant must
be read into the record at the hearing, a copy must be furnished to the
individual, and no other derogatory information may be considered
unless the individual furnishing the same is available for cross-
examination.
Since the hearing is confined to matters raised by the letter of
charges, the substance of the derogatory information supplied by the
regularly established confidential informant, as well as that supplied
by all other persons, would ex necessitate have to be included in the
letter of charges.
Existing and preceding security-loyalty programs have been vigor-
ously and justifiably attacked upon the ground that the accused indi-
vidual frequently has been precluded from making an adequate de-
fense. This was because the notice or letter of charges lacked the
26. Id. at 57. (Emphasis added.)
27. See Confrontation infra.
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necessary definiteness and certainty. In the opinion of the writer,
specificity in the letter of charges is essential to any system which
purports to grant the right of a fair and effective hearing. It is be-
lieved that the Commission's recommendation eliminates the basis of
any claim that the individual is precluded from adequately preparing
his answer to the charges and his defense in support of that answer.
(6) Hearings in the civilian employees' loyalty program, the in-
dustrial security, atomic energy, port security, and civil air trans-
port programs-to be conducted by full-time, qualified, trained
hearing examiners selected from a civil service eligibility list
Under the former loyalty program prescribed by Executive Order
9835, as amended, cases involving applicants for and conditional ap-
pointments to the classified civil service were heard by regional loyalty
boards; cases involving all other employees were heard by agency
loyalty boards composed of government personnel appointed by the
agency head.
Under the existing plan, hearings in the civilian employees' program
are conducted by three-man hearing boards. These boards are selected
from a roster of government employees maintained by the Civil Ser-
vice Commission. More than 1800 persons are presently listed on the
roster, all of whom were nominated by the various departments and
agencies in which they are employed. Requirements are that they be
"competent and disinterested employees from outside the department
or agency concerned" and "persons possessing the highest degree of
integrity, ability and good judgment."
In the industrial security program of the Department of Defense,
hearings are conducted by one of three hearing boards located in New
York, Chicago, and San Francisco.
In the atomic energy security program hearings are held by local
hearing boards consisting of three members appointed by the manager
of operations.
In the port security program hearings are conducted by district
boards consisting of three members. The commandant designates the
chairman of the board and selects two other members, one from labor
and one from a business having a contract with the Coast Guard,
from a panel selected by the secretary of labor.
While the findings and decision of the hearing examiners proposed
by the Commission would be merely advisory to the officer responsible
for the final decision, as they are under existing programs, the hearing
function in loyalty cases is of the utmost importance. The heads of
departments and agencies, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and
other officers vested with responsibility for final decision in the re-
spective programs, do not have the time to review personally every
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case. They are dependent in large measure upon the findings and
recommendations of the hearing board or officer.
The discharge of a civilian employee, or the denial of clearance,
in the industrial security and port security programs on security
grounds, is fraught with the gravest consequences to the individual
involved. The evaluation of the inferences to be drawn from deroga-
tory information relating to loyalty calls for the highest degree of
competent, skilled, trained judgment and for the highest order of in-
tellectual and moral integrity. This is particularly true because the
atmosphere in this area may readily oscillate from one extreme, which
characterizes all dissent as disloyalty, to the other, which denounces
every precaution to protect the national security as a witch-hunt.
While determination of the type required in loyalty or security
cases cannot readily, and in the judgment of the writer, should not,
be absorbed in the judicial system, every effort should be made to sur-
round the hearing function with the impartiality demanded in the
administration of justice, and with the competence expected of judges.
The hearing examiners proposed by the Commission will be full-
time employees. They will be attached to an independent Central
Security Office and must possess the qualifications fixed by the Civil
Service Commission in consultation with the Director of the Central
Security Office.
A function so important both to the individual and to the national
security should not be relegated to individuals-either in or out of
government-who serve merely on a part-time basis and whose prim-
ary interests and responsibilities are in other fields.
(7) Assessing the Burden of Proof
The burden of proof rests neither upon the government nor upon
the individual under charges. The agency bringing the charge, how-
ever, must assume the burden of going forward by submitting to the
hearing examiner information tending to show reasonable doubt as to
loyalty.
It has been asserted that under existing and former practices in
security or loyalty programs, the burden has rested upon the indi-
vidual under charges to establish his defense. Obviously, in those
cases where the charges have been couched only in vague and general
terms, the individual has been compelled to gather and present evi-
dence and information affirmatively satisfying the hearing tribunal
or agency head that he meets the required standard.
Under the recommendations of the Commission the individual is
first of all called in for an oral interview, wherein he is advised of the
nature of the derogatory information and given the opportunity to
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refute or explain. Thereafter, if a letter of charges is issued, it must
be definite and specific; no matters which are not embraced in the
charges can be offered or considered unless the charges are amended.
If the charges are amended, the individual is given a reasonable time
to answer and to prepare his defense to the new matter.
At the hearing the charging agency must present to the hearing
examiner the information upon which it relies as the basis for the
claim that a reasonable doubt about loyalty exists. This information,
with certain exceptions, must be in the form of sworn oral testimony
given either at the hearing or through depositions or affidavits. When
cross-examination is not permitted the substance of derogatory infor-
mation supplied by a regularly established confidential informant must
be read into the record at the hearing, and a copy must be furnished
to the individual under charges.
It is submitted that the recommendations made by the Commission
eliminate the claim that the burden of proof rests upon the individual
under investigation or charges.
(8) Confrontation and Cross-Examination of Adverse Witnesses
Under the civilian employees', military personnel, international or-
ganizations employees', atomic energy, industrial, port, and civil air
transport security programs, when loyalty is in issue, derogatory
loyalty information may not be considered unless the individual
charged has the opportunity to cross-examine under oath the person
supplying such information, except when such latter person is a regu-
larly established confidential informant engaged in obtaining intelli-
gence and internal security information, or vhen such person is not
available for service of subpoena by reason of death, incompetence, or
other reasons. The hearing examiner must supply the individual under
charges with the substance of the information supplied by a regularly
established confidential informant and read the same into the record,
together with the evaluation as to the reliability of such informant
placed upon him by the investigative agency.
Probably the most controversial issue arising out of the operation
of the various government loyalty-security programs, both past and
present, revolves around the fact that individuals against whom loy-
alty or security risk charges have been filed have not been given the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine under oath confidential
informants who have furnished derogatory information. The identity
of the so-called confidential informant does not appear from the report
of the investigative agency, so even the hearing agency has no means
of ascertaining the identity of such confidential informant.
Confidential informants fall, broadly speaking, into two categories:
(1) the regularly established confidential informant who is employed
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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
by the government for purposes of gathering intelligence and internal
security information; (2) the casual confidential informant-that is,
a person in the community who is willing to supply information to the
investigative agency with the understanding that his identity will
be withheld.
It has been the position of the government that revealing the iden-
tity of the regularly established confidential informant who is engaged
in intelligence work would be most damaging to the protection of
national security, inasmuch as disclosure of his identity would make
such informant useless for gathering further information.
In respect to the casual informant, the government has taken the
position that if his identity would be disclosed he would refuse to
give any adverse information, and as a result the sources of much
valuable information required by the government would dry up.
The Commission is of the view that disclosure of a regularly estab-
lished confidential informant, unless his identity has heretofore been
disclosed as a result of his testifying as a witness in a criminal case
or otherwise, would have extremely serious consequences on the na-
tional security. If the identity of such witness may not be disclosed
without compromising the national security, there are only two other
alternatives regarding the use of information of the regularly estab-
lished confidential informant: (1) continue to permit such inforia-
tion to be considered, without allowing the person under charges to
cross-examine the informant under oath; or (2) abandon the pro-
ceedings against the individual charged, where proof of the charges
hinges upon the information supplied by the reguarly established con-
fidential informant.
It has been suggested by those who advocate the latter course that
this is the problem which confronts the government in respect to a
criminal proceeding. The government must make the decision either
to disclose the identity of the regularly established confidential in-
formant, if it is to rely upon his testimony, or otherwise abandon
the use of the testimony.
In the opinion of the Commission a proceeding to determine whether
an employee should be retained in service or granted clearance, when
there is a doubt about his loyalty, is not criminal in nature. Instead,
the Commission feels that the proceedings are purely administrative
in character, having as their purpose only the determination whether
the government employee, in the one case, or the privately employed
individual, in the other, meets the appropriate standard for employ-
ment or clearance.
If the government follows the course of abandoning charges in
cases where proof is solely dependent upon information supplied by
the regularly established confidential informant, then it must retain
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its own employee or grant clearance to the privately employed indi-
dividual notwithstanding that retention in employment or grant of
clearance subjects the government to substantial hazard and risk.
The Commission is of the opinion that national security should not
be sacrificed by the retention in employment or the grant of clearance
where such retention or grant would in fact tend to damage the na-
tional security.
The Commission does, however, recognize that an individual under
charges is most seriously handicapped if he does not know and has no
opportunity to explain or refute the derogatory information supplied
by the regularly established confidential informant. It furthermore
believes that the substance of such information could be supplied to
the individual under charges without sacrificing or compromising
national security. Accordingly, it recommends that in situations
where the identity of the regularly established confidential informant
can not be disclosed without damaging national security, and the head
of the investigative agency employing such informant certifies to that
effect, the substance of information supplied by such informant, if it
relates to loyalty, shall be given to the person under charges. The
Commission further recommends that if the person under charges
questions the completeness or the accuracy of the information supplied
to him, he may request the hearing examiner to call for a further
investigation of the matters in dispute. Thereupon it becomes the
duty of the hearing examiner, if he deems such additional investigation
necessary, to request the investigative agency to make a further in-
quiry and submit the results to the hearing examiner.
In respect to derogatory loyalty information supplied by the casual
confidential informant, the Commission recognizes that many people
will refuse to furnish derogatory information if their identity is dis-
closed or if they are called upon to substantiate their information
by testifying under oath at a hearing. It is true that many persons,
reluctant to become involved in a controversy of this nature, will
undoubtedly refuse to supply derogatory information. On the other
hand, in a matter involving the security of the United States, all
citizens are the beneficiaries of measures designed to protect that
security. The fact that they are interested in the protection of the
national security should in some measure overcome their reluctance to
give derogatory information when such information relates to pro-
tecting the national security. It is obvious that disclosure of the
identity of the casual informant will not in itself affirmatively preju-
dice the national security.
Under these circumstances, the Commission feels that testimony
supplied by a casual confidential informant relating to the loyalty of
the person under charges should not be considered by the hearing
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examiner, or by the agency head charged with responsibility for the
final decision, unless such casual informant is willing to make his
identity known and subject himself to the issuance of a subpoena.
Therefore, the Commission has recommended that derogatory loyalty
information furnished by all persons other than the regularly estab-
lished confidential informant should not be considered by the hearing
examiner or by the agency head unless such person is subject to cross-
examination by the person under charges.
If any identified person who has supplied derogatory loyalty infor-
mation is not available for the service of subpoena because he is dead,
is incompetent, is beyond the jurisdiction, or cannot be found, the
hearing examiner and the agency head may take into consideration
the information supplied by such person notwithstanding the lack of
opportunity to cross-examine. In these situations, however, the hear-
ing examiner and the agency head are cautioned to take into consid-
eration that the person under charges has had no opportunity to
cross-examine the individual supplying the derogatory information.
The studies made by the Commission demonstrate that, in a very
substantial number of security cases under Executive Order 10450,
the derogatory information has been supplied by identified persons
who would be available to testify in support of the information sup-
plied by them. While no conclusive generalization can be made, it is
the opinion of the writer that the number of cases in which proof is
dependent upon the derogatory information supplied by confidential
informants is not as large as is generally supposed.
In concluding its discussion on the subject of confrontation, the
Commission stated in its report:
The balance to be ever observed between protection of the
national security and the safeguarding of individual rights stands
out in sharper relief in the problem of confrontation than else-
where in the loyalty program.
The Commission has studied the range of views, legal, constitu-
tional and moral, running from providing a full confrontation in
all cases to permitting ex parte dismissals with no hearings or
privilege to refute charges. The solution lies somewhere betveen
these opposite poles.
It believes that under its recommendations maximum
confrontation is allowed consonant with security requirements;
that while not emasculating our confidential investigative sources,
they provide for an employee, under definite understandable rules,
the opportunity to obtain sufficient information to intelligently
present his defense.28
28. Report at 68-69.
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(9) Power to Subpoena Witnesses
Where loyalty charges are involved, hearing examiners in the
civilian employee, atomic energy, industrial, port, and civil air trans-
port security programs, and hearing boards in the military personnel
program and the international organization employees' program may
issue process for the compulsory attendance of witnesses, subject to
the restrictions set out below.
In order to implement recommendations of the Commission provid-
ing for the opportunity to cross-examine persons who have supplied
derogatory loyalty information, it is necessary that a statute provide
authority for the issuance of compulsory process to compel the at-
tendance of witnesses. Under the existing statutes there is no such
authority, except where, as in the Atomic Energy Commission, general
subpoena power is lodged in a particular department or agency. Not-
withstanding the absence of power to subpoena, the Attorney General
of the United States has recommended under the existing program
that every effort consistent with national security should be made to
produce witnesses at security hearings, so that such witnesses may be
confronted and cross-examined.
The Commission is of the view that within proper safeguards and
restrictions compulsory process should be authorized. Accordingly,
the Commission recommends that either the government or the em-
ployee may apply to the hearing examiner for the issuance of sub-
poenas. Excepted from subpoena power, however, are regularly estab-
lished confidential informants and those casual confidential inform-
ants who have given their information on the condition they will not
be called as witnesses.
Application for a subpoena must state the name and address of the
witness whose testimony is desired and the substance of the testimony
to be presented by such witness. If the hearing examiner deems the
evidence relevant and not merely cumulative he may issue the sub-
poena. The hearing examiner may also subpoena witnesses on his
own motion. In addition, he may direct that the testimony of the
witness be taken by deposition, either orally or on written interroga-
tories.
The government, under the Commission's recommendation, shall
bear the cost of its own witnesses. The individual involved is required
to deposit sufficient funds to pay the travel and per diem cost of wit-
nesses subpoenaed at his request, with the proviso that if the indi-
vidual is cleared, the funds shall be returned to him and the govern-
ment shall bear the expense.
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(10) Requirement of a Written Report
Hearing examiners shall make a written report which shall include
findings of fact, advisory recommendations to the agency head, and
reasons in support thereof. Examiners are also required to have a
verbatim transcript of the record prepared, a copy of which is to be
furnished to the individual charged in the event he appeals.
Experience has demonstrated that in the administrative process a
mandatory requirement of specific findings of fact as well as a state-
ment of reasons is likely to insure a more careful consideration of the
record. Since the recommendation of the hearing officer is advisory
only, such findings of fact should also be especially helpful to the
officer charged with responsibility for final decision. Furthermore,
in situations where an appeal is taken, the individual has opportunity
to point out the respects, if any, in which the findings are erroneous
or in which they are at variance with the reasons given for the de-
cision.
(11) Right of Appeal to Central Review Board when Decision of
Agency Head Is Adverse
Under Executive Order 10450, no provision is made for an appeal.
The Commission recommends that in those specific areas in which the
initial hearing is conducted by hearing examiners, individuals under
charges be entitled to an additional safeguard against an erroneous
decision by the agency head through an appeal to a competent and
qualified appellate board.
The Central Review Board contemplated by the Commission is to
consist of three members, to be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. The scope of appellate review is
limited to a consideration of the record, and the decision of the Central
Review Board is advisory only.
(12) Rights of Probationary Employees and Applicants for Em-
ployment
Probationary employees and applicants for employment should be
accorded an oral interview, a hearing, and a right of appeal where
discharge or denial of employment is based upon doubt about loyalty.
Probationary employees are those employees in the classified competi-
tive service who may be discharged without cause during the trial
period fixed by civil service regulations.
Under the existing security program, a hearing is not accorded
to probationary employees or to applicants for employment who have
passed the requisite examination and are on the eligible list. The
files of the above employees or applicants follow them from one
agency of the government to another. Obviously, when such files con-
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tain derogatory loyalty information the opportunities for employ-
ment in the federal service are greatly diminished.
The chief argument advanced against granting a hearing to pro-
bationary employees and to applicants is the alleged burden of the
costs involved. The Commission is of the opinion, however, that it is
grossly unfair to debar an individual from employment on loyalty
grounds without according him a hearing, and that this consideration
outweighs the question of cost.
(13) Changes in Security Standard
There should be no readjudication even if the security standard is
changed. Heretofore, one great source of dissatisfaction adversely
affecting employee morale has been that, as the security standard
changed, further investigation and readjudication has been required.
Thus, all employees who were investigated under the standard pre-
vailing under Executive Order 9835 were reinvestigated when the
standard established in Executive Order 10450 went into effect.
(14) Binding Effect of Final Decisions
The operation of loyalty and security programs has been subject
to criticism because an individual granted employment or clearance
by one department or agency may be denied employment or clearance
by other departments and agencies.
The Commission believes that once loyalty charges have been filed,
the prescribed hearings completed, and the decision of the particular
agency head rendered, such decision should be final except in those
cases where new information is developed. The decision, whether
favorable or adverse to the employee, would be binding upon the
agency head who made it, his successors, and the heads of all other
agencies.
While the decision regarding what constitutes new information is
to be made by the head of the particular agency at the time the
question arises, the Commission recommends that such decision should
be reached only after consultation with the appropriate legal officer-
(15) Transfer of Personnel Security Clearance from One Govern-
ment Agency to Another
Under the existing program a scientist having clearance for access
to top secret information at a factory operating under a contract with
the Air Force is subject to investigation and the delay of obtaining
a new clearance if the government should want him to work on a
guided missile program conducted by the Navy at some other plant.
Full field investigations are required for access to top secret informa-
tion. These investigations require time and are costly.
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Where the standard for clearance in one position is the same as in
another, the type of investigation made in determining eligibility for
clearance is the same or comparable to the other, and no further re-
investigation is required because of lapse of time, no sound reason
exists for spending money or time to make a new investigation or
grant a new clearance, unless there is something unusual calling for
a re-evaluation by the transferee agency.
(16) Loyalty Hearings Afforded to Enlistees or Inductees Re-
jected during the Screening Process
Under Department of Defense Directive 5210.9, effective June 19,
1956, a registrant for induction who is rejected on security grounds
is given a hearing if he so requests. Under the Commission's recom-
mendation, the right of hearing where a rejection has been based
upon loyalty ground would be extended not merely to inductees but
also to enlistees. The Commission feels that the status of enlistees is
similar to that of inductees and that they correspondingly should.
be entitled to a hearing.
The majority of individuals who are inducted or who apply for
enlistment are young men or women. Generally speaking, they do not
have the maturity or possess the means to adequately prepare a
suitable defense against charges relating to loyalty. The Commission
is of the opinion that the government should assume the expense
involved in according applicants for enlistment and prospective in-
ductees a hearing when their loyalty is questioned. The Commission
further feels that the armed services should supply counsel to these
individuals in order that they may be properly represented.
(17) Separation of Personnel from the Armed Forces on Grounds
of Possible Disloyalty
It must be remembered that a serviceman who is separated from
the armed forces upon the ground that reasonable doubt about his
loyalty exists has not necessarily been engaged in any subversive
activity. The separation has been based upon information which
establishes reasonable doubt about loyalty. There is, of course, a valid
distinction between reasonable doubt about loyalty on the one hand
and actual disloyalty on the other.
Traditionally, the character of discharge given by the armed ser-
vices has depended solely upon the conduct or character of the in-
dividual demonstrated during the period of his actual service.
However, since the institution of security programs, the armed ser-
vices have frequently hesitated to give an individual who has been
released on security-risk grounds an honorable discharge, notwith-
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standing that his conduct apart from the security-risk charges merited
an honorable discharge.
It is the judgment of the Commission that pre-service conduct
of any person separated from the armed services on the ground of
reasonable doubt about loyalty should not be considered when deter-
mining the type of discharge to be given, except in cases involving
falsification of induction or enlistment papers.
29
Recommendations Designed to Avoid the Dangers
of Overclassification
The classification of defense information and materials is presently
governed by Executive Order 10501. 30 Section 1 of the order-classifi-
cation categories-sets forth three designations: top secret, secret,
and confidential. The criterion of each category is the effect on
national defense that unauthorized disclosure of the information in
question would have. The order specifies that no other designation
shall be employed to classify defense information. Classifications
such as "agency use only," "restricted to department use," etc., are
thus excluded from the scope of the order. Section 1 of the order
provides:
Except as may be expressly provided by statute, the use of the
the classification "secret" shall be authorized by appropriate
authority, only for defense information or material which re-
quires the highest degree of protection. The top secret classifica-
tion shall be applied only to that information or material the
defense aspect of which is paramount, and the unauthorized
disclosure of which could result in exceptionally grave damage
to the Nation such as leading to a definite break in diplomatic
relations affecting the defense of the United States, an armed
attack against the United States or its allies, a war, or the com-
promise of military or defense plans, or intelligence operations,
or scientific or technological developments vital to the national
defense.,,
With respect to the "secret" category, the order states:
Except as may be expressly provided by statute, the use of
the classification "secret" shall be authorized by appropriate
authority, only for defense information or material the un-
authorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage
to the Nation, such as by jeopardizing the international relations
of the United States, endangering the effectiveness of a program
or policy of vital importance to the national defense, or com-
promising important military or defense plans, scientific or
29. Accord, Harmon v. Brucker, 78 Sup. Ct. 433 (1958).
30. Exec. Order No. 10501, 18 Fed. Reg. 7049 (1953).
31. Id. at 7049. (Emphasis added.)
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technological developments important to national defense, or in-
formation revealing important intelligence operations32
With respect to the "confidential" category, the order states:
Except as may be expressly provided by statute, the use of the
classification "confidential" shall be authorized, by appropriate
authority, only for defense information or material the unauthor-
ized disclosure of which could be prejudicial to the defense inter-
ests of the Nation.33
Under the executive order, designated precautions must be taken
respecting the custody and safekeeping of classified defense informa-
tion and materials. Knowledge or possession thereof is to be permitted
only to persons whose duties require such access in the interest of
promoting the national defense, and then only if they have been de-
termined to be trustworthy.
The Commission's report points out that scientists, engineers, and
representatives of industry having contracts with the Department of
Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, and other departments and
agencies possessing classified defense information and materials, have
criticized the existing classification program on three principal
grounds: (1) There is a tendency to overclassify defense information
and materials, disclosure of which would not substantially injure the
national security; (2) Since security at its best can only provide lead
time in this highly technological age, overclassification defeats its own
purpose in that if' retards the free exchange of information; (3) The
cost of handling, storing, and transmitting classified information is
excessive and imposes undue burdens in light of the risk involved
should disclosure occur.
The appearance of Sputniks I and II strikingly illustrates that we
do not and cannot hope to enjoy a monopoly in the realm of scientific
advance and technological achievement-that the deterrents to aggres-
sion we hope to achieve and maintain lie chiefly in getting there with
the "fustest" if not with the "mostest." Indiscriminate, non-essential
classification operating to prevent or retard the free exchange of in-
formation among our own scientists, engineers, and other technicians
therefore defeats the very purpose of classification.
(1) Abolition of the "Confidential" Category
The Commission believes that "top secret" and "secret" categories,
as presently defined, are adequate to protect national security and
recommends abolition of the "confidential" category. "Estimates
32. Id. at 7051. (Emphasis added.)
33. Id. at 7051. (Emphasis added.)
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furnished to the Commission indicate that most of the classified de-
fense information and materials fall in the confidential category. '34
It is highly significant that while Executive Order 10501 contains
criteria or illustrations for the type of information that should be
classified as "top secret" or "secret," none is provided for the guidance
of classifying officers in respect to "confidential" matter. It would
indeed be difficult to set forth any confining or limiting example of
information the disclosure of which "could be prejudicial to the de-
fense of the nation." The phrase "could be prejudicial" accommodates
itself to the broadest of interpretations.
All the departments and agencies of the government which re-
sponded to inquiries of the Commission soliciting opinions on the
abolition of the confidential category were opposed to it. Their posi-
tion, generally speaking, was based upon two grounds: (1) abolition
of "confidential" would require upgrading of a substantial amount of
information to "secret" or "top secret," and (2) the cost in reviewing
the great mass of confidential material to determine the need for
upgrading would be excessive.
Taking note of the second objection above, the Commission's rec-
ommendation as to abolition of "confidential" is made prospective in
its operation. Concerning the first objection, the view that a sub-
stantial amount of defense information has been classified as merely
"prejudicial," when supposedly if disclosed it could lead to war or
a break in diplomatic relations, or to any of the events covered in the
criteria for secret and top secret, is consistent only with a hypothesis
of laxity and dereliction on the part of the classifying authorities. It
is therefore difficult to accept the premise inherent in this objection,
that abolition of the confidential category would require a substantial
amount of upgrading to "secret" or "top secret." All evidence points
to overclassification rather than underclassification.
Elimination of the "confidential" category, in the view of the Com-
mission, involves no substantial risk to security. On the positive side,
it would encourage freer exchange of information and ideas promot-
34. Thus [continues the text] the Department of Defense estimates that
59 percent of its classified material is confidential, as contrasted with 11
percent for secret, and 10 percent for top secret; the State Department
indicates 76 percent for confidential, 20 percent for secret, and 4 percent
for top secret; the Department of Commerce indicates 76.26 percent for
confidential, 23.70 percent for secret, and 0.04 percent for top secret.
The Atomic Energy Commission estimates 49 percent for confidential,
49 percent for secret, and 2 percent for top secret. Only in the Central
Intelligence Agency does the percentage of secret exceed the percentage
of confidential, the figures in this Agency being 28 percent confidential,
61 percent secret, and 11 percent top secret.
Report at 175.
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ing the interests of defense, and eliminate unnecessary costs to the
government and private industry.
(2) Development of Training Program for Administrative Per-
sonnel
Personnel authorized to classify or to recommend classification
should be familiar with the processes which foster scientific and tech-
nological advance. Training programs for such personnel should be
developed with the specific aid of scientists, engineers, and technicians,
familiar with factors relevant to the advancement of scientific and
technological progress as well as the need for protecting national
security.
Executive Order 10501 expressly requires training and orientation
programs for employees concerned with classified defense information
to impress each employee with his responsibility "for exercising vigi-
lance and care" in complying with the provisions of the order.
The Commission's report emphasizes the need for people of unusual
judgment; who should be not only fully aware of dangers arising out
of unauthorized disclosure, but equally aware of the impediments to
national defense and security arising out of indiscriminate restrictions
upon free exchange of ideas and free access to information.
Recommendations Designed to Promote Uniformity,
Consistency, and Efficiency
(1) Creation in the Executive Branch of an Independent Central
Security Office
The Commission was directed by Public Law 30431 to make recom-
mendations concerning the administration of the various security
programs "from the standpoints of internal security and effective
protection and maintenance of the national security." It found a lack
of uniformity in rules and regulations and the application thereof,
particularly in screening and hearing procedures; absence of coordina-
tion between agencies; duplication of forms and records and in in-
vestigative and clearance procedures; lack of training of personnel;
failure to maintain appropriate records and statistics; and a wide dis-
persion of responsibility.
After due consideration of the methods attempted under existing
and preceding program to coordinate the activities of all agencies and
departments, the Commission concluded that internal consistency in
operating an overall security program could be achieved only through
centralization of responsibility in a single independent office. At the
35. 69 Stat. 595 (1955), 50 U.S.C. § 781 (Supp. IV, 1957).
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same time the Commission sought scrupulously to preserve in the
heads of the respective agencies and departments ultimate responsi-
bility for retention in employment and granting or denying of clear-
ance.
The Central Security Office under the Commission's recommenda-
tions would consist of a director and his administrative staff, a central
review board consisting of three members, and the hearing examiners
heretofore discussed. The director and the members of the central
review board would be appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
Presently, each department and agency promulgates its own rules
and regulations. Under the new recommendations, however, the di-
rector of the Central Security Office would prescribe rules of practice
for conducting hearing and review proceedings and would promulgate
regulations, including interpretative guides, as he might deem neces-
sary to promote uniformity in the various loyalty and security pro-
grams.
The director is instructed to conduct continuing surveys and in-
spections and recommend such changes as he deems necessary. He is
required to compile and maintain appropriate statistical records con-
cerning the operation of the programs and submit each year a full
and complete report to the President and the Congress. He is further
charged with responsibility for allocating work among the hearing
examiners so as to minimize delay. While he has no authority to
classify or declassify defense information, he must determine whether
the classification procedures in each agency result in overclassification
and must effectively provide for declassification when necessary.
Requirements that hearing examiners meet appropriate qualifica-
tions, that members of the central review board be appointed by the
President subject to confirmation by the Senate, that hearing exami-
ners and members of the central review board be full time employees
and officers, and that the hearing function be allocated to a separate
and independent office, all provide reasonable assurance that personnel
charged with highly important hearing functions will possess the req
uisite degree of competence and independence which their responsi-
bility requires.
(2) Consolidation of the Separate Industrial Security Programs
of the Military Services into a Single Program under the Office of
Security
Confusion and delay in the operation of the military industrial
security program results from the fact that the Army, the Navy, and
the Air Force each operate their own respective industrial security
programs. The regulations promulgated by each branch of the armed
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services frequently differ. Differences arise with respect to the meas-
ures to be taken for custody and safe-keeping of classified defense
information and materials, and with respect to the granting of clear-
ance for access to such information and materials. Many contractors
who work for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, complain vigorously
about the lack of standardization arising out of the operation of three
separate programs.
The unification of the separate military industrial security pro-
grams into one integrated program, controlled and operated by an
office of security in the office of the Department of Defense, should go
far to eliminate the lack of uniformity presently existing.
(3) Transferability of Personnel Security Clearance
As pointed out in Section (a) (15) above, the Commission believes
that where an individual has been granted clearance for access to
classified defense information in one department, agency, or plant, he
should not be subjected to further investigation to obtain clearance for
access to classified defense information in another department, agency
or plant. Transferability should be permitted where the standard for
clearance is the same and where the investigation upon which the
original clearance was granted was comparable in nature to that re-
quired for the subsequent grant. An exception to this rule, however,
should be recognized when further investigation is required due to
lapse of time or special factors requiring a re-evaluation.
Transferability of clearance under the circumstances set forth
should promote uniformity and efficiency in the administration of the
security program, and eliminate much of the resentment occasioned
by repeated investigations.
Recommendations Designed to Promote Vigorous Enforcement of
Effective and Realistic Security Laws
The congressional declaration of policy earlier set out called "for
vigorous enforcement of effective and realistic security laws and regu-
lations." A study of criminal statutes presently in force reveals the
need for new legislation to cover gaps which interfere with vigorous
enforcement of effective and realistic security laws.
(1) Unauthorized Disclosure of Secret and Top Secret Defense
Information with Knowledge that Such Defense Information Had
Been So Classified Should Be Made a Crime
Public Law 304 which created the Commission on Government
Security38 declared as a matter of national policy that it was vital to
36. See text at notes 1, 28 supra.
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the welfare and safety of the United States that there be adequate
protection of the national security-against loss, or compromise aris-
ing not only from episonage, sabotage, disloyalty, and subversive
activities but from "unauthorized disclosures."3 7
Under existing laws the unauthorized disclosure of classified infor-
mation by employees of the government is made a crime, but unauthor-
ized disclosure by other persons is punishable only if the information
is obtained and transmitted for the use and benefit of a foreign nation.
It must be borne in mind, however, that access to classified defense
information and material is not limited to government employees, but
is shared by thousands of individuals privately employed in defense
plants and in research laboratories. Unauthorized disclosure by such
privately employed individuals could have the same consequences as
unauthorized disclosure by government employees. Manifestly, un-
authorized disclosure in the press could have the same, if indeed not
greater, prejudicial effect.
The Commission has recommended that criminal penalties for un-
authorized disclosure of secret and top secret defense information and
materials should apply not only to employees of the government but
to all persons.
If, as recommended by the Commission, the confidential category
should be eliminated, a large mass of material heretofore classified
would be available to the public and the press, since substantially
more than fifty percent of all classified material is in the confidential
category. But whether or not the confidential category is abolished,
the new proposed criminal sanction would apply only to unauthorized
disclosure of top secret and secret as defined in the proposal of the
Commission. As so defined, defense information and material would
be properly classified top secret only if its unauthorized disclosure
could result in exceptionally grave damage to the nation, and classified
secret only if its unauthorized disclosure could result in serious dam-
age to the nation.
The Commission has recommended the retention of the criteria
contained in Executive Order 10501 for determining what constitutes
exceptionally grave damage or serious damage to the nation. Before
classifying defense information as top secret, the classifying officer
would have to conclude that the disclosure could lead "to a definite
break in diplomatic relations affecting the defense of the United
States, an armed attack against the United States or its allies, a war,
or the compromise of military or defense plans, or intelligence opera-
tions, or scientific or technological developments vital to the national
37. 69 Stat. 596 (1955), 50 U.S.C. § 781 (Supp. IV, 1957).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
defense.' 38 Before classifying defense information or materials as
secret, the classifying officer would have to conclude that unauthorized
disclosure would cause damage "such as by jeopardizing the interna-
tional relations of the United States, endangering the effectiveness of
a program or policy of vital importance to the national defense, or
compromising important military or defense plans, scientific or tech-
nological developments important to the national defense, or informa-
tion revealing important intelligence operations."" 9
The recommendation to attach criminal sanctions for unauthorized
disclosure of classified information has been vigorously criticized as
an attempt to interfere with the freedom of the press or to impose
undue restrictions on the "public's right to know." Apprehensions
have been voiced in the press that classifying authorities could success-
fully conceal corrupt transactions, or their own blunders, through
arbitrary classification of defense information and materials as secret
or top secret.
The emphasis placed by the Commission on the need for the free
flow of information and the concrete recommendations made by it to
the end of minimizing overclassification indicate that the Commission
was fully aware of the prejudicial effects resulting from arbitrary and
capricious classification having no real relationship to the protection
of the national security.
During the course of its deliberations the Commission read hun-
dreds of pages of testimony by scientists, engineers, and others, voic-
ing criticisms of the classification program. In addition the views of
non-governmental personnel familiar with the operation of the pro-
gram were solicited by the Commission, and consideration was given
to the responses made in answer to these inquiries. Little if any
criticism was voiced regarding classification of material and informa-
tion in either the top secret or secret categories. This would indicate
that scientific and technological opinion found no substantial grounds
for complaint in respect to top secret and secret classification under
the definitions and criteria contained in Executive Order 10501.
No system can be devised to guard against arbitrary, capricious, or
corrupt classification under any definition or formula. Hence, if any
particular matter has been classified as secret or top secret when it
could not have been so classified in good faith, the disclosure of such
matter would not fall within the purview of the proposed criminal
sanction. If, however, unauthorized disclosure could bring about the
kind of damage characterized as exceptionally grave or as serious, no
person, whether he be a government employee, a scientist in a research
laboratory, a worker in a defense plant, a newspaper reporter, or a
38. Exec. Order No. 10501, 18 Fed. Reg. 7051 (1953).
39. Ibid.
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publisher should escape the consequences, providing such disclosure
has been made with knowledge or with reasonable grounds to believe
that the information has been so classified.
(2) Evidence obtained by wire tap should be admissible in any
cririnal prosecution for an offense against the security of the
United States, where the investigative agency has received ex-
press written authority from the attorney general to make such
wire tap
In 1927 the Supreme Court held that the admission in evidence of
information obtained by the tapping of telephone wires did not con-
stitute a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution and did not transgress the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination vouchsafed by the fifth amend-
ment." In that same case the Court also decided that the evidence was
admissible notwithstanding that the federal law enforcement officers
in tapping the wires violated the penal statutes of the State of Wash-
ington.
Three members of the Court differed from the majority on the con-
stitutional issue. Mr. Justice Holmes based his dissent upon the view
that the evidence was not admissible because the federal enforce-
ment officers had committed a crime in obtaining it. The phrase "dirty
business," used by Mr. Justice Holmes in the course of his dissent,
has been invoked frequently by those who condemn the use of the wire
tap by law enforcement officers. To the writer it would seem that the
phrase, in the context in which it was used, was intended to apply
not to the act of wire tapping but to the commission of a criminal act
by law enforcement officers and the ratification thereof by the govern-
ment through the use of evidence obtained by criminal means.4 1
Efforts to persuade the Court to overrule the Olmstead case have
as yet not been successful.42
Some seven years following the decision in the Olmstead case, Con-
gress enacted the Federal Communications Act.43 Included therein
was section 605, reading as follows:
40. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927).
41. After stating that he was not prepared to say that "the penumbra of the
4th and 5th Amendments cover the defendant," Mr. Justice Holmes went on to
say that, "apart from the Constitution, the Government ought not use evidence
obtained and only obtainable by a criminal act." Then followed the words: "For
those who agree with me, no distinction can be taken between the Government as
prosecutor and the Government as Judge. If the existing code does not permit
district atorneys to have a hand in such dirty business, it does not permit the
judge to allow such iniquities to succeed." Id. at 469-70.
42. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
43. Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1105 (1946), 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1953).
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[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
. . . and divulge . . . [the] meaning of such intercepted com-
munication to any person .... 44
In Nardone v. United States,45 the Supreme Court ruled that evi-
dence obtained by federal law enforcement officers through intercep-
tion was inadmissible by reason of section 605, notwithstanding the
government's contention that the act was not actually and was not in-
tended to be applicable to law enforcement officers. In the second Nar-
done case" the Court held that the ban applied not only to the contents
of the intercepted message but to all evidence which the government
had obtained solely through the use of information contained in the
intercepted communication.
Recently, the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained by a state
law enforcement officer through a wire tap authorized by state statute
was not admissible in a federal criminal proceeding.47 On the same
day the Court held a police officer could testify concerning conversa-
tion heard by him on an extension telephone, where the recipient of
the message had authorized him to listen in, although defendant sender
had no knowledge of this fact.48
Notwithstanding the first Nardone decision, federal agents pres-
ently tap wires under the construction placed on section 605 by the
Department of Justice-that interception is not prohibited unless
accompanied by divulgence. And ever since the Nardone decision, the
Department of Justice has consistently urged Congress to enact legis-
lation which would permit the use of evidence obtained by wire tap
in certain restricted types of criminal proceedings.
The Commission, under its mandate from Congress, was concerned
only with the effect of the inadmissibility of evidence in connection
with the adequate protection of national security. It had to weigh the
fear of unwarranted intrusions upon the privacy of citizens by un-
scrupulous law enforcement agencies against the inability of the gov-
ernment to punish conspirators who would undermine us all. The
Coplon case49 demonstrates that espionage laws cannot be vigorously
enforced when the proof required to convict depends upon the ad-
missibility of evidence obtained by wire tap.
The Commission has recommended legislation which would permit,
in criminal prosecutions for offenses against the security of the United
States, the use in evidence of information obtained by wire tap. Per-
44. Id. at § 605.
45. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
46. 308 U.S. 339 (1939).
47. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 801 (1957).
48. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 880 (1957).
49. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950).
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missible use, however, would be restricted to cases where the attorney
general has given written authorization to make the wire tap to a
security investigative agency engaged in conducting an investigation
to detect or prevent an offense against the security of the United
States. The interception must be specifically described as to time and
place in the written authorization. As an additional precaution the
proposal requires the attorney general to file reports at six month
intervals with the National Security Council, stating the number of
interceptions authorized by him and the nature of the offense for
which each authorization was given.
Constitutional Issues Arising Out of the Operation of
Loyalty-Security Programs
The "serious and far-reaching problems in reconciling fundamen-
tal constitutional guarantees with the procedures used to deter-
mine the loyalty of Government personnel" 50 which were left unre-
solved by the Supreme Court in Bailey v. Richardsonl are as yet un-
settled. It has been asserted that the loyalty security programs offend
the Federal Constitution by: (1) violating the due process provisions
of the fifth amendment; (2) abridging freedom of speech and freedom
of assembly in violation of the first amendment; (3) violating safe-
guards provided for by the sixth amendment in criminal prosecutions.
All three of the above constitutional questions were raised in Bailey
q. Richardson. In this case the plaintiff was a government employee
who had been removed under Executive Order 9835 upon the ground
that, on all the evidence, there was reasonable ground to believe she
was disloyal to the United States. She had been advised by the Re-
gional Loyalty Board that it had information that she was or hal been
a member of the Communist Party, that she associated on numerous
occasions with known communists and that she belonged to two or-
ganizations which were named in the attorney general's list of sub-
versive organizations.
The plaintiff admitted that she had been for a short time a member
of one of the organizations on the attorney general's list but denied
the remaining charges. She requested and was granted a hearing,
initially by the Regional Loyalty Board, and thereafter on review by
the Loyalty Review Board.
At these hearings plaintiff testified personally and also presented
testimony and affidavits of other witnesses attesting to her loyalty to
50. Chief Justice Warren in Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 338 (1955).
51. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd without opinion by an equally divided
court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
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the United States. No persons other than the plaintiff and her wit-
nesses testified at either hearing. Plaintiff was not given the names
of the persons who furnished the information, had no opportunity to
cross-examine them, and was not confronted by them. An adverse
finding by the Regional Loyalty Board was sustained by the Loyalty
Review Board, and plaintiff was discharged by the agency in which
she was employed. As a further measure, an order was entered de-
barring her from re-employment for a period of three years.
Thereafter plaintiff filed suit in the District Court of the District
of Columbia for a declaratory judgment and for an order directing
her reinstatement. She contended that her discharge was effected
without due process of law in violation of the fifth amendment and
without safeguards vouchsafed by the sixth amendment, and further
claimed that her dismissal denied her freedom of speech and freedom
of assembly as guaranteed by the first amendment. That portion of
the order which debarred her from eligibility for employment for a
period of three years was attacked as a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against bills of attainder.
The district court rendered a judgment adverse to plaintiff and she
appealed. The court of appeals, relying upon United States v.
Lovett,52 sustained her contention that the order barring her from
federal service for three years was constitutionally invalid, but ruled
adversely to her regarding the remaining constitutional questions.
In respect to due process the appellate court held that employment
by the government was neither a property nor a contract right, since
employees of the government were dischargeable at will absent any
statutory limitations upon the power to discharge. In the view of
the court there was no "right" to government employment and there-
fore the due process of law requirements were not applicable. As
regards the sixth amendment, which provides that in all criminal
prosecutions a defendant is entitled to trial by jury and to be con-
fronted by any adverse witnesses, it was held that an administrative
proceeding to determine loyalty is not a criminal prosecution. As to
infringement of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, the
court held that since there was no constitutional right to employment
there was no impairment of the right of free speech or free associa-
tion.
Judge Edgerton dissented. He was of the opinion that dismissal
upon loyalty grounds constituted the kind of punishment which should
entitle an employee to the safeguards of the fifth and sixth amend-
ments. He was further of the view that dismissal merely because of
association or because of membership in organizations including the
52. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
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Communist Party abridged the right of freedom of speech and free-
dom of assembly protected under the first amendment and constituted
a denial of due process under the fifth amendment.
The constitutional issues left undetermined in the Bailey case were
again presented to the Supreme Court some four years later in Peters
v. Hobby." Dr. Peters, a government consultant, had been discharged
from his position on the ground that from all the evidence there was
reasonable doubt about his loyalty. This discharge occurred as a result
of a "post-audit" conducted by the Loyalty Review Board, after Dr.
Peters had on two previous occasions been cleared of charges made
against him.
Dr. Peters appealed his case through the federal courts, and the
order of discharge was subsequently set aside by the Supreme Court
for the reason that the Loyalty Review Board had no authority to
conduct the post-audit investigation and make a determination based
thereon. In view of this ruling, a majority of the Court held it was
unnecessary to pass upon the constitutional issues raised.
Mr. Justice Douglas, while concurring in the result, was of the
opinion that the Court could not avoid the constitutional issues in the
case. He expressed the view that confrontation and cross-examination
under oath were essential to due process. Mr. Justice Black, in his
separate concurring opinion, expressed doubt whether the loyalty pro-
gram embraced in Executive Order 9835 had been authorized by Con-
gress, and he further doubted whether Congress could validly delegate
the powers assumed by the President in promulgating the executive
order.
Although the doctrine established by the court of appeals in Bailey
1,. Richardson has not been expressly overruled or repudiated, two
later decisions by the Supreme Court cast doubt upon those parts of
the Bailey opinion that are predicated on the premise that govern-
ment employment is not a right.
In Wieman v. Updegraff54 the Supreme Court declared invalid as a
violation of due process an Oklahoma statute barring from state em-
ployment individuals who refused to take an oath regarding their
membership in or affiliation with certain proscribed organizations.
The Court held that the statute failed to differentiate between mem-
bers who had knowledge of the organizations' purposes at the time
they joined and those who did not. In the course of his opinion Mr.
Justice Clark, speaking for the majority, said:
We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public
employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional pro-
53. 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
54. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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tection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pur-
suant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory. 5
In Slochower v. Board of Higher Education" the Court held that to
discharge a teacher under a charter provision of the City of New
York without a hearing, solely on the ground that he had claimed
the privilege against self-incrimination in a collateral proceeding,
violated due process of law in contravention of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Court said:
To state that a person does not have a constitutional right to
government employment is only to say that he must comply with
reasonable, lawful, and nondiscriminatory terms laid down by
the proper authorities. 57
The ruling of the Court in the Wieman and Slochower cases lend
support to the implication that merely because employment with the
federal govenment is a privilege rather than a right does not auto-
matically render the due process provision of the fifth amendment
inapplicable.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Parker v. Lester,8
has held that due process requirements of the fifth amendment are
applicable to the security program for maritime employees. In this
case the plaintiffs were merchant seamen who had been denied clear-
ance on security grounds but furnished no bill of particulars. Absent
their security clearance they were unable to pursue their chosen voca-
tion. They brought an action to enjoin enforcement of the Coast
Guard regulations, contending that the regulations as enforced denied
them due process of law in contravention of the fifth amendment.
Under the procedure then in force the Commandant of the Coast
Guard made the initial determination whether clearance should be
denied. No person could be issued a document required for employ-
ment unless the commandant was satisfied that the character and
habits of life of the person were such as to authorize the belief that
his presence on board ship would not be inimical to the security of the
United States. After an initial denial of clearance appeals were pro-
vided, first to a local and thereafter to a national appeal board.
The court of appeals held that the regulations as enforced violated
due process, because the information given to an individual denied
clearance was not sufficiently specific to permit him to make a defense.
The court specifically refrained from passing upon the question
whether regulations might properly be adopted which in some degree
qualified the ordinary right of confrontation and cross-examination
55. Id. at 192.
56. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
57. Id. at 555.
58. 227 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1955).
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of individuals who had supplied derogatory information. The De-
partment of Justice, after obtaining several extensions of time for
filing applications for certiorari with the Supreme Court, ultimately
concluded not to do so.
Following the decision in Parker v. Lester the regulations of the
Coast Guard were amended with the view to curing the defects previ-
ously held objectionable. As of this date no cases involving the
amended regulations have come to the attention of the Writer.
The use of confidential information as the basis for denying a pass-
port under the passport security program has been attacked as a
violation of due process of law. This issue reached the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia in Boudin v. Dulles59 and Dayton v.
Dulles.'- In these cases the court did not pass upon the constitutional
issue but remanded the cases for further consideration with directions
that, in the event the secretary of the state denied a passport on the
basis of confidential information, he should so state, together with
the reasons why such information could not be disclosed.
Upon reconsideration by the secretary of state the passport was
issued to Boudin but denied to Dayton. In connection with the denial
of a passport to Dayton, the secretary stated that he had reached his
conclusion partly on the basis of confidential information contained
in the files of the Department of State, the disclosure of which might
prejudice the national security and the conduct of United States for-
eign relations. Dayton brought a proceeding in a district court to
review this action. The court held that denial of the passport on the
basis of confidential information under the circumstances violated
neither procedural nor substantive due process.""
On appeal the judgment was affirmed.62 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari on January 13, 1958.3 The case squarely presents the con-
stitutional validity of the use of confidential information in connection
with the denial of a passport, and the issue should be settled in the
near future.
The armed services, in determining the kind of discharge to be
issued to a member separated on security-risk grounds, have from
time to time taken into consideration not merely the conduct of an
individual while in the service but the pre-service conduct on which
59. 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
60. 237 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
61. 146 F. Supp. 876 (D.D.C. 1956).
62. Dayton v. Dulles, 26 U.S.L. Week 2203 (1957).
63. 78 Sup. Ct. 342 (1958)
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the security determination was made. The validity of such action has
been challenged as a violation of due process.
In the Harnvwn case65 the plaintiff, who had been separated from the
Army on security-risk grounds, was given an "Undesirable Dis-
charge." He applied unsuccessfully to the Army Discharge Review
Board and to the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records
to have the type of his discharge changed contending that his char-
acter and efficiency had been rated excellent throughout his entire
army life. This relief was denied. In the district court Judge Young-
dahl, while expressing the opinion that certain property rights and
civil rights accrued to the holder of an honorable discharge, granted
summary judgment against the appellant on the ground that the
court lacked jurisdiction to review the nature of the discharge. The
court of appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting. The Supreme Court
has recently reversed and remanded the case to the district court
stating that the type of discharge should be determined solely by his
military record in the army.66
CONCLUSION
If we assume that the due process clause is applicable to all of the
government loyalty-security programs, it does not follow that the
procedures deemed essential to a fair hearing must be the same in
each program. The requisites of due process may be less exacting
when the government is dealing with its own employees or when the
government is dealing with the determination of persons to whom it
is willing to grant access to classified information than when the
government's action cuts off a private individual's means of livelihood
or when it prevents the private citizen from traveling abroad.
Sharp differences of opinion are bound to exist about whether the
proposals of the Commission, if adopted, would meet the constitutional
objections heretofore directed against the current programs and their
predecessors. Such differences will be resolved, if at all, only if and
when the constitutional void in this area has been filled. There is,
however, room for the belief that many who differ on the constitu-
tional issues will agree that the recommendations mark a substantial
advance in affording greater protection to the individual without ad-
versely affecting the protection of the national security.
64. See Bernstein v. Herren, 136 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 234 F.2d 434
(2d Cir. 1956); Schustack v. Herren, 234 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1956); Harmon v.
Brucker, 137 F. Supp. 475 (D.D.C. 1956), aff'd, 243 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
65. Harmon v. Brucker, supra note 64.
66. 78 Sup. Ct. 433 (1958).
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